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The Impact of Social Connections on Merger Performance  
Yuan Li 
           This thesis investigates the impact of social connections on merger performance using a 
sample of U.S. firms. Specifically, we classify connections into four types based on previous 
literature: Type 1 connections refer to firms with overlapping directors or senior managers (Cai 
and Sevilir, 2012); Type 2 connections refer to situations where a director or senior manager 
from the acquirer and another director or senior manager from the target simultaneously serve on 
a third firm around the announcement date of the deal (Cai and Sevilir, 2012); Type 3 
connections refer to situations where a director or senior manager from the acquirer and another 
director or senior manager from the target share a common educational tie or a past employment 
tie (Ishii and Xuan, 2014); Type 4 connections refer to the existence of cross-holding 
institutional investors, defined such that an institutional shareholder holds both shares of the 
bidder and the target around the announcement of the transaction. We find that the many of the 
conclusions reached by prior literature with respect to the influence of each of these types of 
social connections on the value creation of acquiring firms are not robust. In particular, they are 
sensitive to changes in sample period, industries, model specification and sample selection 
criteria. In addition, our results suggest that, on average, cross-holding institutional shareholders 
have positive total returns around the merger announcement date, while they tend to realize 
negative returns once we constrain the sample to the deals with negative acquirer announcement 
returns. Our results also suggest that cross-holding shareholders have significantly higher returns 
from the acquirer and the target together than from the acquirer alone, and acquirers with larger 
percentage of cross-holding shareholders are associated with lower announcement returns. By 
systematically considering all possible types of connections in the merger context, we find that 
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1. Introduction  
            The social network describes a social structure made up of a set of nodes and links 
between them (Allen and Babus, 2008). In the modern financial system, social connections play 
a crucial role due to the high degree of interdependence among the interested parties. In the 
context of mergers, social connections across merging firms might enhance information 
transmission and reduce information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target (Start and 
Yim, 2010; Hochberg et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; Zaheer et al., 2005; Jessen and Koenig , 
2003; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003). On the other hand, social connections might lead to weaker 
critical analysis and result in flawed decision making (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006; Rennebog and Zhao, 2011; Bouwman, 2011; Guiso et al., 2000). More specifically, the 
empirical literature has defined such social connection as belonging to one of four categories. As 
described in Figure 1, Type 1 connections refer to firms with overlapping directors or senior 
managers (Cai and Sevilir, 2012); Type 2 connections refer to situations where a director or 
senior manager from the acquirer and another director or senior manager from the target 
simultaneously serve on a third firm around the announcement date of the deal (Cai and Sevilir, 
2012); Type 3 connections refer to situations where a director or senior manager from the 
acquirer and another director or senior manager from the target share a common educational tie 
or a past employment tie (Ishii and Xuan, 2014); Type 4 connections refer to the existence of 
cross-holding institutional investors, i.e. institutional shareholders who holds shares of both the 
bidder and the target around the announcement of the transaction. In this thesis, we examine the 
manner in which each of these types of connections affects value creation in a merger.  
           To the best of our knowledge, four papers are closely related to this thesis and shed light 
on this topic (Cai and Sevilir, 2010; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Harford 
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et al., 2010). However, they all focus on one specific type of connection and ignore other types 
of connections that might be present at the same time and also influence the acquirer abnormal 
return. In this thesis we analyze how these different types of social connections influence the 
value of acquiring firms around the announcement date of the deal. We systematically consider 
all possible types of connections in the merger context, and analyze how they affect acquirer 
return and how they are interrelated.  
             By using a sample of U.S. firms from 1999 to 2013, we find that the conclusions reached 
by prior researchers might be sensitive to the changes in sample period, industries, model 
specification and sample selection criteria. While Cai and Sevilir (2010) find that acquirers with 
social connections tend to realize higher announcement returns, we find that acquirers with such 
connections are more likely to have lower announcement returns. One possible reason could be 
that we use different databases and sample periods. Cai and Sevilir (2010) write a PYTHON 
program to read proxy statements of the acquirer and the target, and choose the time period from 
1996 to 2008. In contrast, we use the BoardEx database (similar to Ishii and Xuan, 2014) to 
collect the network data and investigate mergers between 1999 and 2013. Another possible 
reason could be that they do not consider the influence of other types of connections. Specifically, 
they investigate a certain type of connections using a full sample of 1,664 M&A deals, while 
only 156 out of them are identified as connected deals. Their results might be biased without 
controlling the impacts of other types of connections especially when the connected transactions 
occupy less than one-tenth of their full sample. 
           Ishii and Xuan (2014) find that acquirer-target social ties play a significantly negative role 
in acquirer returns around the merger announcement. However, our results suggest that their 
findings might not be robust to alternative specifications. In particular, their reported relationship 
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is no longer present once we control for the characteristics of the target, change the sample 
period or eliminate financial institutions from our sample.  
           With respect to the total returns to institutional investors, Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) 
find that cross-holding institutional shareholders (institutions that hold both shares of the 
acquirer and the shares of the target) on average do not lose money around the merger 
announcement. Their findings indicate a plausible reason why we continue to observe such 
apparently value destroying actions on the part of acquirers. As such, these findings are 
especially interesting in situations where the losses incurred by a cross holding institution on 
acquiring firms are more than offset by gains from the target. Our results suggest that such 
conclusions are no longer reached once we constrain the sample to transactions with negative 
acquirer returns – for such cross-holding institutions, the losses from the acquirer are not offset 
by larger gains from the target. By using shareholder-by-shareholder analysis, Harford et al. 
(2010) argue that cross-holdings have little effect on firm behavior in mergers, since investors’ 
gains in the target are not influential enough to compensate for their losses in the acquirer. Our 
results reveal that on average cross-holding shareholders realize negative total returns in the 
mergers with negative acquirer announcement returns, but their total returns from the acquirer 
and the target are significantly higher than returns from the acquirer alone. We also find that 
acquirers with larger percentage of cross-holding shareholders are associated with lower 
announcement returns. Thus, our results indicate that cross-holdings have some effects on 
acquirer behavior, although the impacts are perhaps not as significant as Matvos and Ostrovsky 
(2008) suggest. 
             Our study differs from previous literature in five ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first study to systematically consider all possible types of connections in the 
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merger context and analyze their effects on the value of acquiring firms around the 
announcement date. Second, we extend the scope of prior research by investigating connections 
among directors, senior managers and institutional shareholders. Third, contrary to previous 
studies, we use both categorical and continuous data to measure each type of connection, which 
provides more precise and comprehensive explanations of network effects on value creation. 
Fourth, we categorize institutional shareholders into three types based on Bushee’s (1998) 
Institutional Investor Classification and take a closer look at the performance of dedicated 
institutional investors. Fifth, we examine the relationship between different types of connections 
and illustrate how they are related.  
              The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the existing 
literature that applies the network theory to answer financial questions. Section 3 presents the 
major hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data used in this thesis and provides summary 
statistics. Section 5 introduces the methodology. Section 6 presents the results of the study. 
Section 7 concludes and puts forward possible directions for future research.   
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Overview of Network Effects in Finance  
             The argument, “network as resources”, has been examined by Campbell et al. (1986), 
and they find that size and composition of networks have positive effects on an individual’s 
socioeconomic status. Recently, a growing number of papers use the concept of social network to 
answer financial questions. Hoang and Antoncic (2003) review the relationship between social 
ties and entrepreneurship. They indicate that networks provide information advantages and lead 
to positive outcomes for entrepreneurs and firms. The research on nascent entrepreneurial 
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ventures shows that networks are important social capital and have significantly positive effects 
on the performance of entrepreneurs (Honig and Davidsson, 2003). Jenssen and Koenig (2002) 
indicate that social ties play an important role in collecting information. Jack (2005) finds that 
strong social ties not only provide knowledge and information, but also enhance business and 
personal reputations. Engelberg et al. (2012) explore how social links between banks and firms at 
the individual level influence company performance. They find that firms with such ties 
generally pay lower interest rates, receive higher credit ratings, and have better subsequent stock 
performance.  
            Hochberg et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between venture capital networks and 
the performance of venture capital investments. With respect to fund performance, they indicate 
that well-networked VCs are associated with better subsequent fund performance. Cohen et al. 
(2007) assess the impact of educational network on mutual fund returns. They find that fund 
managers prefer to place larger bets on companies where they are connected and such managers 
gain significantly more from these connected stakes than non-connected stakes. Zaheer et al. 
(2005) find similar results using a sample of Canadian mutual fund companies. They state that 
better network structure helps the firm exploit its internal innovative capabilities and therefore 
enhances firm performance. However, Kuhnen (2009) does not find such positive relationship 
when he investigates board-advisor ties. He concludes that although such connection increases 
the likelihood of hiring among these two parties, it makes no difference in the welfare of fund 
investors.  
           Another stream of the literature extends the topic by examining the impact of social 
connections on CEO compensation. Larcker et al. (2005) analyze the connections between 
insider and outsider directors and show that the degree of connections between these two parties 
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is positively related to CEOs’ total compensation. Hwang et al. (2009) use a unique sample of 
Fortune 100 firms and show that either conventionally or socially dependent boards are 
associated with lower turnover and higher level of CEO compensation. Kramarz et al. (2013) 
investigate the networks between CEOs and directors using a sample of French public firms. 
They draw similar conclusions that better-connected firms are more likely to pay more to their 
CEOs and less likely to replace underperforming CEOs. Moreover, Engelberg et al. (2009) show 
that such positive relationship between networks and compensation is more significant if 
connected firms are in the same industry cluster or are geographically close. Renneboog et al. 
(2011) focus on the social connections between executive and non-executive directors of UK 
companies. They find that managerial influence, which is derived from social networks, plays an 
important role in determining compensation.  
           Other researchers look at the effects of connections between CEOs and directors. 
Directors can be nominally regarded as independent, even if they have strong social connections 
with CEOs of the firm. Fracassi et al. (2012) explore the relationship between CEO-director ties 
and firm value by using a broad panel dataset. They find that social ties between CEOs and 
directors undermine the effectiveness of corporate governance and therefore reduce firm value. 
Kedia et al. (2011) show that CEO-director connections are significantly positive related to 
corporate fraud. Nguyen (2012) extends prior work by empirically analyzing CEO turnover 
using a sample of French firms. His findings reveal that the closeness of the relationship between 
a CEO and a director is negatively related to CEO turnover.  
2.2 Overlapping Managers and Directors 
            An alternative approach to analyze this issue is to consider more direct connections (as 
opposed to those created by social networks) in the form of directors or executives who serve on 
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more than one firm (often as a director in one firm and in the management of another). There is a 
small but growing literature in corporate finance on the effects of such overlapping roles across 
firms. Hallock (1997) investigates the influence of interlocking board of directors on CEO 
compensation and find that such interlocks are linked to higher CEO salaries. Core et al. (1999) 
find that firms with directors who have multiple directorships are associated with higher CEO 
compensation. Also, such higher CEO compensation leads to weaker governance structures and 
poorer company performance. Fich et al. (2003) find that the number of board mutual 
interlocking directorships is associated with higher CEO compensation and lower turnover. 
Barnea et al. (2009) find similar results. They use empirical evidence to support the reputation 
theory and state that firms with well-connected board of directors are more likely to pay more to 
their CEOs.  
          Bouwman (2011) analyzes the influence of overlapping directors on corporate governance 
practices. She finds a selection-priority phenomenon in terms of selecting directors, and points 
out that firms are more likely to accept similar corporate governance policies when they share a 
common director. Xuan and Bouwman (2012) further discuss this issue in a wider context, 
including equity issuance, dividend policy and earnings management. Chiu, Teoh and Tian (2012) 
analyze the effect of overlapping directors on earnings management. They find that the behavior 
of earnings management propagates among interlocking directors and the impact is highly 
significant even after controlling endogenous factors.  
          Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence to support the view that busy directors increase the 
likelihood of subsequent firm underperformance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find different 
results on the topic of multiple directorships. They argue that the limitations of Ferris et al. 
(2003)’s paper in methodological choices lead to the insignificant results. Fich and Shivdasani 
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(2006) use a number of alternative tests to examine the effects and show that firms with busy 
outside directors are more likely to experience weaker corporate governance. Renneboog and 
Zhao (2011) find similar results using a sample of UK firms. 
             Bizjak et al. (2009) examine the structure of interlocking board of directors by 
emphasizing its effects on backdating stock options. They indicate that the presence of 
interlocking directors is statistically and economically significant in explaining the practice of 
backdating stock options. Reppenhagen (2010) investigates how overlapping directors influence 
firms’ accounting methods. His findings further support previous research regarding the 
propagation effects among interlocking boards of directors.  
2.3 Applications to M&A  
             Haunschild (1993) finds that overlapping directors tend to make similar acquisition 
decisions based on their previous acquisition experience. Beckman and Haunschild (2002) find 
that acquiring firms are more likely to exhibit better acquisition performance and pay less for the 
acquisitions if they have network partnerships with targets. Schonlau and Singh (2009) indicate 
that firms with well-connected boards generally have better post-merger performance than do 
firms with non-central boards. Stuart and Yim (2010) look at how interlocking networks of 
directors influence the likelihood that private firms become targets in private equity-backed 
transactions, and their findings support the view that networks facilitate information transmission 
and influence firm performance.  
           This thesis builds on a growing stream of literature that analyzes the influence of social 
networks various overlaps on mergers and acquisitions. To the best of our knowledge, four 
papers are currently close to this thesis. Cai and Sevilir (2010) study the connections between 
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directors from the acquiring firm and directors from target firm, and find that such connections 
lead to greater acquirer announcement returns. Ishii and Xuan (2014) examine the social ties 
between the acquirer and the target, and define such social connections as education ties or 
professional ties. They find that such connections are associated with lower value creation in the 
acquirer. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) analyze this issue from shareholders’ perspective and 
investigate total returns to cross-holding institutional shareholders (i.e. institutions that own 
shares of the acquirer as well as the target). Their findings indicate that cross-holding 
shareholders generally do not lose money around the announcement date of the merger, since 
their gains from the target outweigh their losses from the acquirer. Harford et al. (2010) find 
different results and argue that Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008)’s findings are not convincing 
without conducting a shareholder-level analysis. Harford et al. (2010) find that, in most cases, 
the gains of cross-holding shareholders from the target are not significant enough to offset their 
losses from the acquirer. Harford et al. (2010)’s findings are against the view that cross-holdings 
have an impact on firm behaviors. 
3. Hypotheses  
            Generally, there are two opposing views regarding the impact of social connections in the 
field of finance. Researchers who support the positive effects of networks draw on its role in  
information transmission (Start and Yim, 2010; Hochberg et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; 
Zaheer et al., 2005; Jessen and Koenig, 2003; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003). They state that 
networks enable firms to gain access to more information, which is valuable when firms make 
corporate decisions. Besides, such connections offer opportunities to gather public information at 
lower costs and provide access to more private information.  
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           On the other hand, some researchers find that social connections play a negative role (Ishii 
and Xuan, 2014; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Rennebog and Zhao, 2011; Bouwman, 2011; Guiso 
et al., 2000). They point out that such negative impacts are due to flaws in decision making, 
which means individuals tend to make subjective judgments or lower due diligence standards 
when they have personal networks with the interested parties. Based on above views, we put 
forward two opposite hypotheses with respect to the impacts of social connections on the value 
creation of acquiring firms.  
H1 (a):  Social connections between the acquirer and the target at the interpersonal level are 
associated with higher value creation of the acquiring firm around the announcement date of the 
deal;  
H1 (b):  Social connections between the acquirer and the target at the interpersonal level are 
associated with lower value creation of the acquiring firm around the announcement date of the 
deal.  
              In this thesis, we also examine the fourth type of connection, institutional shareholders 
who hold both shares of the acquirer and the target around the announcement date of the deal. 
We investigate whether those overlapping institutional shareholders lose money from the merger 
around the announcement date. One possibility is that their gains from the target can offset the 
losses from the acquirer, and therefore in total they do not lose money from such transaction. 
This might explain the facts that institutional shareholders vote for the mergers although 
acquiring firms generally experience negative abnormal returns around the deal announcement 
(Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008). Another possibility is that their gains from acquiring firm are 
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insufficient to offset their loss from the target (Harford et al., 2011), because they hold 
substantially lower stakes in the target.  
H2 (a): Overlapping institutional shareholders on average do not lose money from the merger 
around the announcement date of the deal;  
H2 (b): Overlapping institutional shareholders on average lose money from the merger around 
the announcement date of the deal.  
             Moreover, we explore whether the results about the overlapping institutional 
shareholders are driven by certain types of institutional investors. To address this concern, we 
split the sample into three types based on their investment styles: transient, quasi-indexed and 
dedicated (Bushee, 1998). We further analyze the return to each type of institutional investor 
around the merger announcement.  
H3 (a): Returns to cross-holding institutional shareholders differ significantly according to their 
investment style;  
H3 (b): Returns to cross-holding institutional shareholders are similar no matter which type of 
investment style they follow.  
             Considering that director or executives might hold stakes in the acquirer as well as in the 
target and alumni connections might result in professional ties in certain cases, we expect that 
different types of connection might be interrelated to some extent.  
H4 (a): Different types of connections are interrelated to a certain extent;  
H4 (b): Different types of connections are not interrelated.  
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4. Data  
4.1 Sample Formation  
             The raw merger and acquisition data is sourced from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) U.S. mergers and Acquisitions database. This database provides us M&A deal 
information, including the announcement data of the deal, acquirer and target names, payment 
method, deal attitude, number of bidders, acquirer and target industries, and etc. We investigate 
the deals that took place from 1999 to 2013 and require that acquirers and targets must be 
publicly traded in the U.S stock market.  Also, the deal must be completed and the percentage of 
shares owned by acquirer after the transaction is 100%.   
            Our network information is collected from the BoardEx database of Management 
Diagnostics Limited, which provides data in the field of relationship capital management. 
Specifically, it offers profiles of directors and senior managers based on their past or current 
professional experience, education background and associations joined. Since BoardEx does not 
provide a unique name for each association and the information is highly incomplete in this 
category, this thesis focuses on professional ties and educational ties. However, this database 
does not provide most frequently used identity codes, such as CUSIP or PERMNO, so we 
manually merge BoardEx information with our sample of mergers by company names and dates. 
In order to examine the accuracy of the database, we also check some of the data with 
information provided by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
               We use the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database to obtain 
information on institutional common stock holdings and transactions. Our sample is merged with 
this database to collect institutional ownership information for each acquirer and target by 
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requiring that both the acquirer and the target have data on the database in the quarter-end prior 
to the announcement data of the merger. Moreover, Bushee’s Institutional Investor Classification 
Data is used to identify each institutional shareholder’s investment style.  
            The sample then is matched with the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat databases to get the daily stock returns and financial information of each acquirer and 
target. For those firms missing values in financial information from the Compustat database, 
Bloomberg is used as a complementary database to obtain data. Information about stock 
ownership of directors and executive officers as well as number of directors on the board is 
extracted from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. We 
collected those information by reading firm’s Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), which 
each acquirer and target had filed before the merger.   
            Our sample of merger is extracted from SDC and includes 3666 deals based on 
aforementioned criteria. After merging with Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings Database 
and BoardEx by requiring both bidder and target firms available on the databases, 955 deals 
remain.1 Matching with CRSP and Compustat also leads to missing data either in acquirer or 
target and leaves 882 deals for our analysis.  
4.2 Definition of Connections 
            This thesis investigates the effects of social connections on the value creation of 
acquiring firms around the merger announcement. We classify social connections into four types 
based on characteristics of the connection and closeness of the relationship.  
1 A majority of the lost observations are due to insufficient information in the BoardEx data.  
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             Type 1 connections: The first type examines the connection about overlapping directors 
or senior managers (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). It includes two possible situations: (1) the acquirer 
and the target share a common member of board around the announcement date; (2) the 
connected individual serves on the board of acquirer (target) and simultaneously takes the role of 
senior manager in the target (acquirer). Following this definition, we requires that the 
overlapping director or executive must start the role in the bidder firm and the target firm no 
later than the announcement date of the deal. Also, director or manager must end the role in the 
bidder firm and target firm no earlier than the announcement date. Based on this definition, 125 
deals satisfy these criteria.  
            Type 2 connections: The second type examines the connection where a director (senior 
manager) from the acquirer and another director (senior manager) from the target simultaneously 
serve on a third firm around the announcement date of the deal (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). As before, 
we require the director or executive must start the role in the bidder (target) firm and the third 
firm no later than the announcement date of the deal, and must end the role in the bidder (target) 
firm and the third firm no earlier than the announcement date. According to this definition, 93 
deals are considered as having the second type of connections. Among them, 41 deals satisfy the 
criteria of both the first and the second type, so 52 deals exclusively satisfy the definition of the 
second type.  
            Type 3 connections: The third type analyzes the connection where a director (senior 
manager) from the acquirer and another director (senior manager) from the target share a 
common educational tie or a past employment tie (Ishii and Xuan, 2014). Educational ties are 
identified as situations where directors or managers from the acquirer and the target graduate 
from the same academic institution, such as universities or colleges. Ishii and Xuan (2014) 
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regard all the alumni of a same academic institution as sharing educational ties, and have proved 
the results are consistent when time overlaps on the dates of graduations are considered. 
Analogously, past employment tie is defined as a situation where directors or managers from the 
acquirer and the target both worked at the same third company in the past. The major difference 
between the second type and the third type with respect to employment ties is that the second 
type refers to ties at the time of the merger while the third refers to ties prior to the merger. In all, 
697 deals satisfy this definition, of which 530 belong exclusively to the third type. 
           Type 4 connections: The fourth type regards cross-holdings of institutional investors, 
defined such that an institutional shareholder holds both shares of the bidder and the target 
around the announcement of the transaction. After merging the full sample with Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database, 716 deals satisfy this criterion. Among these 
deals, 120 deals do not overlap with the above three types. Since the fourth type might be 
stronger than the third type, we also build a subsample containing 567 deals, which satisfy the 
criteria of the fourth type without overlapping with the first two types.  
             In order to take a closer look at the connection among board members, we build another 
subsample to analyze four types of connections among board members. Specifically, if the 
acquirer and the target share a common member of board at the time of the merger 
announcement, then the deal is counted as satisfying the definition of the first type. The other 
three types are defined likewise. According to this new definition, the first type consists of 36 
deals. The second type includes 79 deals and exclusively has 57 deals. 638 deals are identified as 




4.3 Data Description  
            Table 1 shows the distribution of the mergers in our sample by year. Column 2 and 
column 3 of Table 1 present numbers and percentages of deals for our full sample, followed by 
the four subsamples. The table indicates that the third and the fourth types are more common 
than the first two types in the context of mergers. It also reveals an increasing trend in the 
number of mergers during our study period. However, considering the BoardEx database is 
established in 1999, the lower number of deals in the early years is probably due to the low 
coverage at company’s start-up stage. In the analysis section, we further test this concern by 
splitting the sample period into two parts. 
            Table 2 presents the distribution of mergers in our sample by industry. The industry 
categories are classified according to 48 Fama-French Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. The table shows that our sample is more oriented towards financial institutions, business 
services, electronic equipment, chemical products and instruments companies. Considering the 
high leverage of financial institutions, in the analysis section we further do a number of 
robustness tests to examine whether including financial institutions disturbs our main results.2 
            Panel A of Table 3 reports the summary of statistics for the acquirer and the target. It 
shows that on average acquiring firms in our sample are larger than acquired firms as measured 
by the natural log of total assets. We also use sales as an alternative measurement, and the 
pattern is consistent. We use ROA to measure profitability, and find that acquiring firms are 
more profitable than target firms. Alternatively, stock run-up is used to measure firm 
2 Our inclusion of financial institutions at this stage is motivated by the fact that some of the prior studies do include 
them in their analysis. Since one of the major objectives of this thesis is to examine the robustness of prior results, 
we retain these firms to ensure that our results can be directly compared to the earlier ones.  
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performance, and the results are consistent. 3  Firms’ operating performance is measured by 
operating cash flow, and Table 3 indicates that acquiring firms are generally associated with 
higher level of CFO than acquired firms. Our sample shows a similar pattern found by previous 
studies, which conclude that targets on average have lower leverage and lower profit margin than 
bidders do (Stevens, 1973; Wansley et al., 1983; Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1990).  
            In terms of leverage, the difference between the acquirer and the target is still significant. 
In the subsamples with defined connections, the use of debt is relatively higher in acquiring firms. 
The table also suggests that targets have relatively lower market-to-book ratio than acquirers do. 
The relatively lower valuation of targets by the market encourages acquiring firms to make 
merger decisions, which supports the view that firms with higher profitability and highly valued 
by the market are more likely to be the bidders for the acquisitions (Chappell, Jr et al., 1984). 
Compared with acquiring firms, acquired firms tend to have higher level of insider ownership, 
consistent with previous findings that managers in acquiring firms with lower level of 
stockholdings are more likely to engage in the acquisition activity (Lewellen and Loderer, 1985; 
Gugler et. al. 2008).  
            Comparing each type of connections, we find that firms with connections are relatively 
larger than firms without connections. Furthermore, connected firms exhibit stronger capability 
of using their assets to generate earnings, measured by ROA ratio. The difference is further 
magnified with respect to firms’ leverage ratio. Table 3 shows that connected firms are more 
likely to use debt to finance their operations and generally associated with higher level of 
Tobin’s q than non-connected firms. Moreover, insider ownership of connected firms is lower 
than non-connected firms, indicating that connected firms’ shareholdings are more diversified 
3 All variables used in this thesis are as defined in the Table 5.  
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between insider and outsider investors. We do not observe significant difference in statistics 
among firms with different types of connections.  
            Panel B of Table 3 reports deal characteristics for our sample. Deal diversification is an 
indicator variable, which equals to one if the bidder and the target in the same industry. Panel B 
indicates that connected firms are less likely to combine two firms in the same industry than non-
connected firms. In our sample, 99% of mergers are marked as friendly, which supports the prior 
finding that hostile tender offers have almost disappeared in recent years (Andrade et al., 2001; 
Betton et al., 2008). The high cost of initiating a hostile tender offer in today’s legal environment 
and the development of antitakeover strategies play indispensable roles in the decreased number 
of hostile takeovers.  
           Besides, connected firms in our sample are more likely to choose tender offer as a method 
of acquisition. The main benefit of tender offer is the faster speed in execution. When bidders 
choose tender offer method, they make an offer directly to the target shareholders and generally 
complete the transaction 36 days faster than using a merger method. The main cost with tender 
offer is that the mandatory disclosure increases the number of potential bidders and raises 
takeover premium (Betton et al. 2008; Offenberg et al., 2014). Since the prior relationship 
between the bidder and the target threatens other potential competitors in the market, the benefits 
of tender offer are more likely to be greater than its costs for our connected subsamples. The 
statistics presented in Panel B are consistent with the finding of Offenberg et al. (2014) that firms 




            We apply the event study method and multiple regression approach to investigate how 
the direct and indirect networks between directors (executives) from acquiring firms and 
directors (executives) from acquired firms influence the value creation of acquiring firms around 
the announcement date of the merger. In order to examine such impacts more clearly and 
precisely, we use two sets of proxies to measure connections. Besides, we also calculate dollar 
return and adjusted return to cross-holding institutional shareholders and take a closer look at the 
wealth effects for such investors.  
5.1 Impacts of Acquirer-target Connections on Value Creation of Acquiring Firms 
5.1.1 Short-term Event Study 
             In order to test our hypotheses, we first do univariate analyses using event study 
approach. Market model and Fama-French three-factor model are used to investigate the impacts 
of the event around the merger announcement.  
             Market model is the most commonly used model to detect normal returns (Brown and 
Warner, 1985). We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the market return and follow Cai and 
Sevilir’s (2012) paper, estimating market parameters for each firm over the 200 trading days 
ending two months before the announcement of the merger and acquisition.  
ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βiRM,t+Ɛi,t) 
            Where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, Ri,t is the realized return for firm i 
on day t, RM,t is the expected return on the CRSP value-weighted market index on day t, βi 
measures the sensitivity of firm i to the market and Ɛi,t is the market model prediction error term.  
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            Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by aggregating the abnormal returns 
across the event window [t1, t2]. We use CARs to measure short-term effects of the merger on the 
value creation of the acquirer and the target. The merger announcement day is deemed as the 
event day 0.  
CARi [t1,t2] = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡1  
              As a robustness test, we also use multi-factor model developed by Fama and French 
(1993) to increase the explanatory power of the model and examine the impacts of the event. 
This model is an extension of the capital asset pricing (CAPM) model and considers the 
influence of market risk, size and value.  
(Ri,t – rf,t) =αi + βi,M (Rm,t –rf,t) + βi,SMB SMBt + βi,HML HMLt +Ɛi,t 
             Where SMBt stands for small minus big, which captures the excess return of small cap 
stocks over big cap stocks. HMLt refers to high minus low, which captures the excess return of 
stocks with high market-to-book ratio over stocks with low market-to-book ratio. The time-series 
data are sourced from Kenneth R. French’s Data Library.4 Ri,t is the expected return for firm i on 
day t, rf is the risk-free return rate, and Rm,t is the return of market portfolio on day t.  
5.1.2 Multiple Regression 
             To further test the impacts of connections on the value creation of acquiring firms 
around the merger announcement, more comprehensive multiple regression tests are applied to 
our data by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach (Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors used in calculation of t-statistics). Considering the influence of other factors, 




                                                            
characteristics of the firm and the deal as control variables in our regressions. The model is 
specified as follows: 
CARi = β0 + β1Tiesk, it + Xj βj  (k=1,2,3 4) 
            Where k equals to 1 to 4 and Tiesk stands for aforementioned four types of connections 
respectively. Xj βj stands for the control variables included in the regression. i stands for the firm 
i and t stands for the event year t. Specifically, Xj βj consists of the following factors (detailed 
definitions are presented in Table 5). 
Xjβj = β0 + β1Sizei,t-1 + β2Qi,t-1+ β3Leveragei.t-1+ β4Run-upi,t-1 + β5OCFi,t-1 + β6 
StockDeal+β7InsiderOwnership5i,t-1+ β8DiversifyngAcquisitioni,t + β9TenderOfferi,t + 
β10Attitudei,t + β11MergerEqualsi,t + β12 NumberBids +β13FixedIndustryi,t + β14 FixedYeari,t 
            We use two methods to measure each type of connection. TiesDummyk (k=1 to 4) 
measures the existence of the connection by using a categorical variable, which takes on the 
value of one if there is a connection at the interpersonal level between the participants in the 
merger, and takes on the value of 0 if there is no such connection. TiesPercentk (k=1 to 4) 
measures the degree of the connection by using a continuous variable. For the first three types, it 
is calculated by dividing the number of total ties between board members of the acquirer and the 
target by the number of total possible ties, which equals to the number of board members in the 
acquirer times the number of board members in the target at the end of the year immediately 
preceding the announcement of the deal (Ishii and Xuan, 2014).  
TiesPercent1,2,3 = 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
Number of board members in acquirer ∗ Number of board member in target 
5 Insider ownership is the number reported in the table reporting beneficial ownership in the proxy statement 
obtained from Edgar. It is the total ownership of officers and directors as a group. 
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             For the fourth type, the degree of the connection is calculated by dividing the stakes of 
overlapping institutional shareholders owned in the acquiring firm by total outstanding shares of 
the acquiring firm at the end of quarter immediately preceding the deal announcement (Harford 
et al., 2010).  
TiesPercent4=
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑁𝑁 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂_𝑂𝑂  
            Where i stands for each overlapping institutional shareholders, who own both shares of 
acquiring firms and target firms.  
5.2 Impacts of Acquirer-target Connections on the wealth of Institutional Shareholders 
             We take a closer look at the fourth type by examining the wealth effects for overlapping 
institutional shareholders, who holds both shares of acquiring firms and target firms around the 
announcement date of the merger. As discussed in prior section, we expect those institutional 
investors will generally lose money from the acquirer and gain money from the target. We are 
interested in whether their gains and losses can balance out as Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) 
found. In order to investigate total return to cross-holding institutional investor, we follow 
Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008)’s paper and calculate both dollar return and adjusted return to 
cross-holding institutional shareholder by using the following methods. 
DollarReturn cross-ownership shareholder=∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶  ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶 ∗  𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂,𝑂𝑂  
ScaledReturn cross-ownership shareholder =  dollar return to cross−ownership shareholder ∑ percentage holdings ∗ Market capitalization𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇  
            Where Percentage Holdings are calculated by dividing shares held by the cross-holding 
institutional shareholder by total shares outstanding of the firm, and market capitalization is 
calculated by multiplying stock price by shares outstanding around the announcement date. CAR 
stands for cumulative abnormal returns and is calculated by using the aforementioned market 
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model approach. We use five event windows [0, 0], [-1, 1], [-2, 2], [-3, 3] and [-5, 5] to present 
results. ScaledReturn is the adjusted return to cross-holding shareholder by taking into account 
the total holdings in both the acquirer and the target.  
             When we compare returns to each type of institutional shareholders based on Bushee’s 
Institutional Investor Classification (1998), paired difference test is applied to the data in order to 
assess whether the difference in returns is significant. T-value test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
are both used to examine the difference in mean return, but only t-test values are presented in the 
table.  
6. Results 
6.1 Univariate Analysis  
            The results of univariate analysis are presented in Table 4. The table reports cumulative 
abnormal returns of the acquirer and the target over five event windows. In panel A, the results 
of full sample are presented first, followed by four subsamples with different types of 
connections. The last category of panel A reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for non-
connected deals, which do not have any type of connection as defined in the thesis.  
            The pattern of our results is in line with previous studies (Fuller et al., 2002; Masulis et 
al., 2007), while CARs of acquiring firms are slightly higher than the findings of Ishii and Xuan 
(2014). When we follow their paper and constrain the sample period to 1999-2007, the CARs of 
acquirers are generally consistent with their paper (Ishii and Xuan, 2014) with values of -0.81%, 
-1.14%, -1.03%, -1.24% and -1.55%, respectively (untabulated). By using either the market 
model approach or Fama-French model approach, results are of the same sign and magnitude.   
Panel A of Table 4 suggests that deals with connections have negative impacts on the return of 
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acquiring firms. Compared with the third and the fourth types, the first two types exhibit stronger 
influence on the value reduction of the acquirer around the merger announcement date.  
             The CARs of targets are all significantly positive, which is also consistent with previous 
studies (Capron et al., 2002; Fuller et al., 2002; Masulis et al., 2007). Comparing different types 
of connections, we do not observe much difference in their CARs, which supports the findings of 
Cai et al. (2012) and Ishii et al. (2014).  In this thesis, we focus on investigating the impacts of 
networks on the value creation of acquirers rather than targets based on two reasons. First, 
previous literatures indicate that shareholders of acquirers on average experience value reduction 
around the merger announcement, while shareholders of targets on average gain money because 
of such announcement (Jarrell et al. 1989; Moeller, 2005; Masulis et al., 2007). Generally, 
“losses hurt more than gains feel good” (Kahneman et al., 1984), so examining returns to the 
acquirer has more research meanings. Second, previous studies (Cai et al., 2012; Ishii et al., 2014) 
as well as our results in panel A indicate that networks have little impacts on the abnormal return 
of targets. Therefore, the remainder of this thesis only focuses on the effects of networks on 
acquiring firms.  
           We further test the difference in mean CARs between the connected and the unconnected 
subsamples and present the results in Panel B of Table 4. The first row indicates the difference in 
mean CARs between the first type subsample and the unconnected subsample, and the difference 
is highly significant over the five event windows. The results are similar for the other three types.  
6.2 Multiple Regression 
           We further investigate the impacts of connections on the value creation of the acquirer 
around the announcement date of the transaction in a multivariate setting by controlling for other 
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variables which possibly influence acquirer returns. Table 5 presents all the variables used in 
these regressions. 
6.2.1 Director Connections 
            In this section, we only focus on the connections among firm director, which means the 
connected individual must sit on the board of both firms. The remainder of the section is 
organized as follows. First, we make the analysis based on the entire sample period by using two 
sets of proxies to measure connections: discrete variables and continuous variables (equations are 
provided in section 5.1.2). Second, to expel potential bias in the results, we conduct a number of 
further analyses by changing sample period, sample industry, control variables or sample 
selection criteria.  
            Table 6 presents the regression results for our full sample by using continuous variables 
to measure the closeness of connections. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables 
are the first three types of connections. In this section, we do not include the fourth type on the 
grounds that such type of connection is unrelated to board of directors. Specifically, regression (1) 
and regression (2) include all three types of connections: the first type, the second type excluding 
the first type, and the third type excluding the first two types.6 Regression (3) and (4) examine 
the impacts of the first type, and likewise for the remaining regressions in Table 6. We include a 
number of control variables in regressions, including deal characteristics and acquirer 
characteristics which possibly influence dependent variables.  
6 We expect that the first type of connection is more direct and therefore potentially important than the second type 
and likewise the second type is more important than the third type. Thus the rationale for our classification is that we 
attempt to classify connections based on the strongest existing level of connection.  
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            As indicated in Table 6, when we include all three types of connections in the regression, 
the coefficients of main explanatory variables all exhibit negative signs. However, only the 
second type shows significant impacts. We further look at the impact of each type individually. 
Table 6 suggests that all the types of connections exhibit negative signs, while only the impact of 
the second type is significant at the 0.1 level. At this stage our results are inconsistent with 
whose of Cai and Sevilir (2010) who find that the acquirer-target ties have a positive impact on 
acquirer returns. One possible reason could be that we use different databases and sample 
periods. Another possible reason could be that they do not consider the influence of other types 
of connections. With respect to the third type, the sign of our results are consistent with the 
findings of Ishii and Xuan (2014), while the impact is insignificant. In the following sections, we 
further examine whether the difference in significance is due to the changes in sample period or 
model specification. 
            The estimated coefficients on control variables are consistent with findings in prior 
literature (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012). Similar to Ishii and Xuan’s (2014) result, 
the size of the acquiring firm is statistically insignificant. We use two proxies to measure the 
acquirer size (the natural logarithm of total book assets and the natural logarithm of sales), and 
the results are consistent. With respect to leverage ratio, Table 6 suggests that higher leverage of 
the acquirer is associated with higher acquirer abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Maloney et al., 1993). The stock run-up of the acquirer is 
significantly and positively related to the value creation of the acquirer, which is also consistent 
with prior studies (Ishii and Xuan, 2014). The results are consistent when we use ROA as an 
alternative proxy to measure firm performance (Harrison and Godfrey, 1997). 
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             When we look at control variables with respect to deal characteristics, the results are also 
in line with previous literature (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012). Deal diversification, 
tender offer and equal merger are all positive but largely insignificant related to the value 
creation of the acquiring firm around the merger announcement (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). The 
impact of the number of bidders on the dependent variable is negative but insignificant. All the 
regressions in the even columns are controlled for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 
The explanatory power of independent variable improves when we include fixed effects into 
regressions. In contrast, Table 7 reports the regression results for the full sample by using 
discrete variables to measure the existence of connections. Our results suggest that the estimated 
coefficients of explanatory variables are all negative but largely insignificant.  
            Recalling prior results, we do not observe consistently significant influence of the third 
type of connection on the returns of acquiring firms. When we changed the event window to 
shorter periods, the pattern is consistent with the results we presented in Table 6 and Table 7.  
We are curious whether the significantly negative results presented in the Xuan and Ishii 
(2014)’s paper are sensitive to the changes in sample period. In the following regressions, we 
split the sample period into two parts: 1999-2007 and 2008-2013. The first period (1999-2007) is 
exactly same as the study period used in Xuan and Ishii’s paper (2014). By doing this, the two 
subsamples consist of 382 and 500 deals, respectively.  
             Table 8 presents the regression results for the first subsample. Column (1) – (6) report 
regressions using continuous variables, while column (7) – (9) report regressions using discrete 
variables. On the left side of the Table 8, we notice that the impacts of connections on the 
acquirer returns improve greatly compared with the results in table 6. Using dummy variables as 
measurements, we do not observe statistical significance on the coefficients of independent 
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variables. In contrast, the regression results for the second period are presented in Table 9. Our 
results indicate that almost all the coefficients of explanatory variables exert insignificant 
influence on the response variables. Following Ishii and Xuan (2014)’s paper, we take a closer 
look at the third type of connection by reconstituting two subsamples for period 1 and period 2, 
and require firms in these two subsamples to have the third type of connection. We use 
continuous variable to measure the degree of connection and redo regressions based on 
subsamples of 256 deals and 375 deals for period 1 and period 2, respectively. The estimated 
coefficient of the third type is significantly negative during the first period while insignificant 
during the second period (untabulated). Above results imply that the impacts of social 
connections on the value creation of acquiring firms mainly correspond to the early years of our 
sample.  
             Considering particularities of financial institutions, we next eliminate those institutions 
and explore whether the results are largely driven by them. Table 10 presents regression results 
during the first period. It indicates that the second types of connections still exert significant 
influence on acquirer abnormal returns, while the first and the third type no longer show 
significant impacts after eliminating financial institutions. Using discrete variables, the estimated 
coefficients are consistently insignificant as indicated in previous regressions. Table 11 reports 
results for non-financial firms during 2008-2013. We do not observe significance on the 
estimated coefficients of all the three types of connections. The results are consistent with prior 
findings when we use discrete variables as alternative measurements. Based on above results, we 
consider that including financial institutions in the sample might cause potential bias in the 
results, especially for the third type of connection. This is particularly troubling as Cai and 
Sevilir (2010) and Ishii and Xuan (2014) include financial institutions in their sample. 
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             So far, we only take into account acquirer characteristics in our regressions, and we next 
include target characteristics in our analysis to check whether the results are sensitive to the 
changes in control variables. Table 12 presents the regression results for the first period, 
suggesting that higher connection is associated with greater value reduction of the acquirer 
around the merger announcement. Similarly, Table 13 reports the results for the second period. 
Only the coefficient of the second type is significant. Our results suggest that the third type of 
connections might be highly sensitive to the changes in control variables. To expel the influence 
of financial institutions, we eliminate deals involving financial firms and redo the regressions by 
controlling both acquirer and target characteristics, and the results are consistent.  
            Another potential concern with previous models is the sample selection bias. Specifically, 
when we do a regression using a specific type of connection as the independent variable, deals 
with other types of connections in the sample might also affect the dependent variable and 
therefore diminish the explanatory power of the independent variable. To address this concern, 
we reconstitute three subsamples and the regression results are presented in Table 14. The 
subsample used in columns 1 and 4 consists of deals with the first type of connection and deals 
without any kind of connection introduced in this thesis. The other two subsamples are 
constituted analogously. Compared with Tables 6 and 7, Table 14 shows that the significant 
levels of the coefficient estimates of independent variables largely improves by using either 
continuous variables or discrete variables to measure connections. We also control for target 
characteristics and redo the regressions, and results are consistent. Due to the limitation in the 
number of observations, we are unable to test whether the results are still consistent after 
eliminating financial institutions from the sample. 
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            In summary, our results suggest that prior findings (Ishii et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2012) 
about the impacts of social connections on the acquirer returns around the merger announcement 
tend to be more statistically significant during 1999-2007 than 2008-2013. The significance of 
the impact of the connection is sensitive to the change in variable specification. We observe 
more significant impacts on acquirer returns by using continuous variables to measure 
connections rather than using discrete variables. Moreover, although both Ishii et al. (2014) and 
Cai et al. (2012) include financial institutions in their samples, our results indicate that such 
approach might cause bias especially for the third type. Furthermore, we find that the impact of 
social connections is also sensitive to the change in model specification. The significance levels 
of coefficient estimates generally decrease after for controlling target characteristics in the 
models. Besides, we also find that analyzing each type of connection individually and ignoring 
the impacts of other types of connections might lead to biased interpretations.  
6.2.2 Director and Senior Manager Connections 
           In this section, we analyze the connections among directors and executives. Due to 
insufficient information for senior managers, we only use discrete variables to measure 
connections. The results are presented in Table 15. Model (1) includes all four types of 
connections and model (2) incorporates the first three types. All the estimated coefficients 
exhibit consistent pattern, suggesting the connections are negatively related to acquirer returns 
around the merger announcement. Column 3 to column 6 reports the result for each type of 
connection, respectively. Column 7 of Table 15 shows the result for the fourth type by using 
continuous variable to measure the connection. The results suggest that the third types play a role 
in explaining the dependent variable, while the other types are incapable of doing so. 
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            Considering potential limitations discussed previously, Table 16 presents the regression 
results by eliminating the financial institutions from our sample. It reveals that the significant 
levels of estimated coefficients diminishes, indicating that including financial institutions into the 
sample causes a degree of bias. Furthermore, we reconstitute four subsamples and in each 
subsample we include deals with one specific type of connection and deals without any type of 
connection. The results are presented in Table 17, suggesting that all four types of connections 
exert strong influence on acquirer returns after reconstituting subsamples. The results for 
directors and executives reinforce our findings in the section 6.2.1.  
6.3 Wealth Effects for Overlapping Institutional Shareholders 
            In this part, we further investigate the wealth effects for cross-holding institutional 
shareholders. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) find that on average such institutional shareholders 
do not lose money from the merger, since their gains from the target offset their losses from the 
acquirer. We use our panel dataset of overlapping institutional shareholders to examine their 
findings.  
           First, we investigate the issue at the deal level. Specifically, we add up the stakes of all the 
overlapping institutional shareholders in each deal and analyze how their holdings in the acquirer 
and the target influence their total returns. Second, we explore the issue based on the shareholder 
level. Harford et al. (2010) argue that Matvos and Ostrovsky’s (2008) findings are not 
convincing without conducting a shareholder-by-shareholder analysis. We further look at total 
return to each overlapping institutional shareholder. Third, we apply Bushee’s institutional 
Investor classification (1998) to our data and categorize shareholders into three types based on 
their investment styles: transient, quasi-index and dedicated investor. We compare total returns 
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to cross-holding shareholders in each group and investigate which type of investor plays a 
prominent role in determining the results.  
6.3.1 Wealth Effects at the Deal Level   
           As introduced in the methodology section, we use two approaches to calculate returns to 
cross-holding institutional shareholders: DollarReturn and ScaledReturn. The results are 
presented in Table 18. All the five event windows suggest a uniform result that total returns to 
overlapping institutional shareholders are significantly positive when we evaluate this issue at 
the deal level. As reported in Table 4, shareholders generally lose money from holding the shares 
of the acquirer. However, since overlapping shareholders partake in both the acquirer and the 
target, total returns to such shareholders are positive, which suggests that the losses from holding 
the shares of the acquirer are balanced out by the gains from holding the shares of the target. 
This result is consistent with Matvos and Ostrovsky’s (2008) finding.  
              The last two columns of Table 18 shows that on average cross-holding institutional 
shareholders hold 31% stakes in the acquiring firm and 36% stakes in the acquired firm. This 
result suggests that when we investigate welfare to overlapping institutional investors based on 
the deal level, it seems that they hold similar stakes in the two participants of the merger around 
the announcement date. However, the fact is quite different, and we further illustrate this point in 
the next section.  
6.3.2 Wealth Effects at the Shareholder Level 
            Analyzing total returns to investors based on the deal level might be problematic. It is 
possible that cross-holding institutional investor holds substantial stakes in the acquirer, while 
holds only small percentage of shares in the target. If this is the case, the gains from the target 
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may not be sufficient to counterbalance the losses from the acquirer. On the other hand, if 
investors have large stakes in the target and meanwhile hold small stakes in the acquirer, 
technically they will realize significantly positive returns (Harford et al., 2010). When we 
accumulate all the stakes of overlapping institutional investors together, it creates an illusion that 
they hold roughly equal stakes in the acquirer and the target. Therefore, it is necessary to further 
investigate the issue at the shareholder level.  
           Panel A of Table 19 reports total return and adjusted total return to each overlapping 
institutional shareholder. The pattern of dollar return and scaled return to such investors is 
consistent with the results presented in Table 18, indicating that overlapping institutional 
shareholders are less likely to lose money around the announcement date of the merger. On 
average, each cross-holding institutional investor holds 0.38% shares of acquiring firm and 0.45% 
shares of acquired firm. The difference of their stakes in the acquirer and the target is reported in 
panel B of Table 19, and it is significant at the 0.01 level. The result supports Harford et al. 
(2010)’s finding that institutional investors display a noteworthy difference in ownership stakes 
in the acquirer and the target.  
            We conduct an in-depth analysis on returns to overlapping institutional shareholders by 
focusing on deals with negative acquirer announcement returns. The reasoning behind examining 
this panel dataset is that such transactions are the major determinants of whether cross-holdings 
contribute to the total gains of institutional investors. In other words, if acquiring firms realize 
positive CARs around the transaction announcement, overlapping investors are more likely to 
have positive returns. Therefore,  Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008)’s views are more convincing if 




            The results are presented in panel C of Table 19. We constitute five subsamples for the 
five event windows. For example, when we collect observations for the first event window, we 
require the corresponding acquiring firms to realize negative cumulative abnormal returns over 
the first event window. Likewise, we constitute remaining four subsamples. The first row of 
Panel C presents the mean total return to cross-holding institutional investors. The results suggest 
that holding shares in the target does not completely compensate their losses from the acquirer, 
which questions the generality of the previous finding that cross-holding institutional 
shareholders on average do not lose money from the merger around the announcement date 
(Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008). The third row of Panel C shows that returns to overlapping 
institutional investors from acquiring firms are all negative over the five event windows, which 
is consistent with our prediction that shareholders generally lose money from holding the shares 
of acquiring firms around the merger announcement. To further examine whether cross-holdings 
contribute to the wealth of investors, we test the difference between returns from the acquirer 
alone and returns from the acquirer and the target together. The differences are significant over 
the five event windows, suggesting that holding shares in the target significantly improves 
institutional investor value although on average the gains are insufficient to offset their losses 
from the acquirer. Our results complement those of Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008). 
6.3.3 Institutional Classification Analysis  
             To explore whether the above results are driven by certain types of institutional 
shareholders, we classify institutional investors into three categories based on Bushee’s 
Institutional Investor Classification (1998): dedicated, transient and quasi-indexer. Dedicated 
institutional shareholders behave like active investors (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998). They usually 
hold large blocks of shares for a long time and play a monitor role in managers’ performance. 
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Transient institutional investors make frequent transactions and tend to hold small stakes in 
various firms (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998). Quasi-indexing institutional shareholders behave like 
passive investors, who are less likely to monitor firms or involve in firms’ management decisions 
(Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998).  
            To test our hypothesis, we calculate their total dollar returns and adjusted total returns 
around the merger announcement. The detailed results are reported in panel A of Table 20. In our 
sample, the majority of the cross-holding institutional investors are classified as transient or 
quasi-index investors. In terms of total returns, the results are consistent with prior findings. 
Specifically, when we use the dollar return as a measurement, dedicated investors on average 
realize larger positive returns around the announcement date compared with transient or quasi-
index investors. By using the adjusted total return as a measurement, dedicated institutional 
investors still outperform quasi-index investors, while they slightly underperform transient 
investors.  
              We next examine transactions with negative acquirer announcement returns, and the 
results are presented in panel B of Table 20. Like the results in panel C of Table 19, on average 
cross-holding investors realize negative total returns around the announcement date of the 
merger, but the magnitude of value reduction declines substantially by holding the shares of the 
target. With respect to returns to each type of cross-holding shareholders, transient investors 
make the most money compared with the other two types of investors, and dedicated investors 
perform better than quasi-index investors. Our results suggest that even though dedicated 
investors do not outperform transient investors around the announcement date, they still greatly 
benefit from holding the shares of targets.  
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           Recalling the results in section 6.2.2, we find that the existence of cross-holding 
institutional investors is associated with lower acquirer returns around the merger announcement. 
Combined with the finding that returns to cross-holding investors are substantially higher from 
the acquirer and the target than from the acquirer alone, the results imply that acquirers with 
overlapping institutional shareholders tend to pursue targets more aggressively and such 
shareholders are more likely to support acquirer value reduction deals. 
            In summary, we find that on average cross-holding institutional shareholders realize 
positive total returns around the merger announcement for our full sample, and this result are 
consistent with Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008)’s finding. However, our results also suggest that 
overlapping institutional owners have negative returns once we constrain the sample to deals 
with negative acquirer CARs, but overlapping shareholders’ total returns from the acquirer and 
the target together are significantly higher than returns from the acquirer alone. By analyzing the 
impacts of cross-holdings, we find that cross-holding shareholders are more likely to support 
acquirer value reduction deals. Decomposing institutional investors based on their investment 
styles, we find that the patterns are consistent in all three subsamples.  
6.4 The Relationship between different types of Connections  
             In this section, we further investigate the relationship among different types of 
connections. In our director subsample, 71 directors satisfy the definition of the first type of 
connection, and 43 out of 71 directors have detailed ownership information in company proxy 
statements. Except for one director, all the other directors hold both shares of the acquirer and 
the target. On average, overlapping director holds 4.12% of acquirer’s shares, and 8.37% of 
target’s shares. This result implies that the first type and the fourth type are interrelated to a 
certain extent. In other words, overlapping directors are usually also regarded as cross-holding 
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investors. Due to the insufficient data in executive ownership, we are unable to extend such 
conclusion to senior managers.  
             Also, we test the correlation between each type of connections, and we find that certain 
types of connections are correlated. By using continuous variables to measure connections, the 
first and the second type have strong positive relationship with an R squared value of 0.701. 
Besides, the second and the third type also exhibit positive relationship with an R squared value 
of 0.268. When we use discrete variables to measure connections, we find moderate positive 
relationship between the first type and the second type.  
7. Conclusions and Topics for Future Research  
              This thesis builds on growing literatures that provide empirical evidence on the impact 
of social connections. Specifically, we focus on the interpersonal relationship in the context of 
mergers, and define such relationship into four types according to prior literature (Cai and Sevilir, 
2010; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Harford et al., 2010). Using a sample 
of U.S. firms during 1999-2013, we investigate the impacts of different types of connections 
around the merger announcement date.  
              Our results suggest that the strong impacts of connections on value creation of acquiring 
firms, which has been found in previous literature (Cai and Sevilir, 2010; Ishii and Xuan, 2014), 
might be sensitive to the changes in sample period, industries, model specification and sample 
selection criteria. Also, we state that taking into account all types of connections might facilitate 
to make more reasonable and comprehensive interpretations. With respect to cross-holding 
institutional shareholders, we find that on average they have positive total returns around the 
merger announcement date, while they tend to realize negative returns once we constrain the 
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sample to deals with negative acquirer CARs. Cross-holding shareholders have significantly 
higher returns from the acquirer and the target together than from the acquirer alone. The pattern 
is consistent when we decompose the sample into three types according to their investment styles. 
Furthermore, we find that the different types of connections are interrelated to some extent.  
              This thesis systematically discusses the impact of social connections around the merger 
announcement and provides some insights into the growing literature of networks. However, due 
to the limitation of access to the databases and insufficient data, we are unable to 
comprehensively compare the differences among various databases regarding the network data. 
An interesting direction for future research would be to further discuss how networks are formed 
and how different types of networks are interrelated. Moreover, another research area would be 
to analyze networks at the firm level instead of interpersonal level and investigate how the 
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 Appendix  
 
Figure 1 Definition of Connections 
          Type 1 connections refer to firms with overlapping directors or senior managers (Cai and 
Sevilir, 2012); Type 2 connections refer to situations where a director or senior manager from the 
acquirer and another director or senior manager from the target simultaneously serve on a third 
firm around the announcement date of the deal (Cai and Sevilir, 2012); Type 3 connections refer 
to situations where a director or senior manager from the acquirer and another director or senior 
manager from the target share a common educational tie or a past employment tie (Ishii and 
Xuan, 2014); Type 4 connections refer to the existence of cross-holding institutional investors, 
i.e. institutional shareholders who holds shares of both the bidder and the target around the 
announcement of the transaction. 
 
  
Panel A: Type 1 Connection Panel B: Type 2 Connection 
Panel C: Type 3 Connection Panel D: Type 4 Connection 
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Table 1 Deals classified by Year 
        This table shows the distribution of the mergers in our sample by year. Numbers and 
percentages for the full sample are presented first, followed by numbers and percentages for the 
four subsamples. 
Year Full Sample Percentage 1
st Type Percentage 2nd Type Percentage 3rd Type Percentage 4th Type Percentage 
1999 11 1.25% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 5 0.72% 4 0.56% 
2000 8 0.91% 1 0.80% 0 0.00% 3 0.43% 8 1.12% 
2001 7 0.79% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 7 0.98% 
2002 13 1.47% 1 0.80% 0 0.00% 4 0.57% 7 0.98% 
2003 10 1.13% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 0.43% 8 1.12% 
2004 31 3.51% 7 5.60% 2 2.15% 20 2.87% 28 3.91% 
2005 72 8.16% 9 7.20% 12 12.90% 59 8.46% 57 7.96% 
2006 104 11.79% 17 13.60% 15 16.13% 85 12.20% 92 12.85% 
2007 126 14.29% 21 16.80% 14 15.05% 110 15.78% 108 15.08% 
2008 78 8.84% 18 14.40% 12 12.90% 68 9.76% 67 9.36% 
2009 78 8.84% 14 11.20% 10 10.75% 65 9.33% 63 8.80% 
2010 108 12.24% 21 16.80% 10 10.75% 91 13.06% 85 11.87% 
2011 63 7.14% 4 3.20% 5 5.38% 49 7.03% 49 6.84% 
2012 82 9.30% 8 6.40% 6 6.45% 62 8.90% 63 8.80% 
2013 91 10.32% 4 3.20% 7 7.53% 73 10.47% 70 9.78% 





Table 2 Deals classified by Industry 
        This table presents the distribution of mergers in our sample by industry. The industry categories are classified according to 48 
Fama-French Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 
Industry Full 1st   2nd   3rd   4th  Industry Full 1st   2nd   3rd   4th  
Engineering&Management Services 8 3 1 7     7 Water Transportation 3 0 0 1 3 
Health Services 15 1 1 14 12 Railroad Transportation 1 0 0 1 1 
Amusement& Recreation Services 5 0 1 5 5 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1 0 0 1 1 
Motion Pictures 3 1 0 0 3 Instruments&Related Products 63 11 5 54 55 
AutoRepair, Services,&Parking 2 0 0 2 2 Transportation Equipment 8 1 1 7 7 
Business Services 106 23 7 81 91 Electronic& Other Electric Equipment 51 6 7 41 45 
Personal Services 2 0 0 2 2 Industrial Machinery& Equipment 55 9 10 49 47 
Hotels & Other Lodging Places 3 0 0 1 3 Fabricated Metal Products 4 0 1 3 4 
Holding&Other Investment Offices 43 3 4 32 36 Primary Metal Industries 5 0 0 4 3 
Real Estate 2 1 0 1 1 Leather& Leather Products 1 0 0 0 1 
Insurance Agents, Brokers, & Service 1 0 0 1 1 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 1 0 0 1 1 
 Insurance Carriers 22 5 3 21 19 Petroleum& Coal Products 7 0 1 6 6 
Security& Commodity Brokers 15 1 1 10 11 Chemical&Allied Products 69 7 8 60 53 
Nondepository Institutions 3 0 0 3 3 Printing & Publishing 10 0 0 9 9 
Depository Institutions 209 15 16 145 156 Paper & Allied Products 5 1 0 3 4 
Miscellaneous Retail 7 2 1 7 7 Furniture & Fixtures 1 0 0 1 1 
Eating& Drinking Places 4 1 1 4 3 Lumber & Wood Products 1 1 1 1 1 
Apparel& Accessory Stores 7 2 1 7 7 Apparel & Other Textile Products 2 1 0 2 1 
Automative Dealers& Service  1 1 0 1 1 Food & Kindred Products 8 1 2 7 8 
Food Stores 4 0 0 3 4  Special Trade Contractors 2 1 0 2 1 
General Merchandise Stores 1 1 1 1 1 General Building Contractors 2 0 0 2 2 
Building Materials& Gardening 2 0 0 2 2 Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 1 0 1 1 1 
Wholesale Trade -Nondurable Goods 7 1 0 7 5 Oil & Gas Extraction 30 9 5 27 18 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 7 0 0 6 6 Coal Mining 1 1 0 1 0 
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 23 7 6 19 19 Metal, Mining 3 1 2 2 2 
Communications 38 5 3 24 28 Agricultural Services 1 0 0 1 1 
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 3 2 2 2 2 Agricultural Production – Crops 1 0 0 1 1 
Transportation by Air 2 0 0 1 2 Total 882 125 93 697 716 
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             Table 3 Statistics Summary of Acquirer and Target  
          Panel A of this table reports the summary of statistics for the acquirer and the target and Panel B reports the deal specific 
characteristics of our sample. 












Panel A: Acquirer & Target Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Acquirer Statistics             
size (LN) 8.8349 8.7028 8.8784 8.5937 9.2184 9.1563 8.9992 8.8279 9.0031 8.8642 7.6241 7.5940 
leverage Ratio 0.2034 0.1662 0.2026 0.1572 0.2089 0.1523 0.2032 0.1682 0.2057 0.1719 0.1807 0.1081 
Tobin’s Q 2.0163 1.6180 2.2118 1.7580 2.0687 1.5929 2.0728 1.6720 2.0453 1.6206 1.9095 1.4329 
ROA 0.0977 0.0944 0.1106 0.1107 0.1069 0.1044 0.1038 0.1011 0.1035 0.1002 0.0612 0.0254 
Insider Ownership 7.9649 3.7650 8.5642 3.4000 6.7159 2.5000 7.1636 3.1000 7.4419 3.3000 12.0895 8.0000 
OCF  0.0043 0.0235 0.0192 0.0290 0.0166 0.0291 0.0034 0.0233 0.0044 0.0237 0.0010 0.0244 
Target Statistics             
size (LN) 6.2503 6.3537 6.7087 6.7091 7.2361 7.0602 6.3840 6.4588 6.4887 6.5040 4.6511 5.1986 
leverage Ratio 0.1957 0.1164 0.1944 0.1268 0.2313 0.1534 0.1908 0.1127 0.1977 0.1266 0.2356 0.1084 
Tobin’s Q 1.6279 1.2612 1.7608 1.4958 1.9489 1.4179 1.6784 1.3119 1.6863 1.2931 1.3948 1.0541 
ROA 0.0294 0.0236 0.0419 0.0352 0.0638 0.0701 0.0360 0.0277 0.0434 0.0307 -0.0769 0.0076 
insider ownership 15.1044 9.0050 13.7507 7.0200 12.4057 5.3000 14.6332 8.1700 15.0976 9.2800 17.2641 10.6000 
OCF -0.1110 0.0073 -0.1027 0.0012 -0.1330 0.0238 -0.1264 0.0039 -0.1274 0.0069 0.0174 0.0333 
Panel B : Deal Statistics             
Diversifying Acquisition 0.6961 1.0000 0.6720 1.0000 0.6882 1.0000 0.6930 1.0000 0.6885 1.0000 0.8000 1.0000 
Attitude 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0108 0.0000 0.0029 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of Bidders 1.0420 1.0000 1.0720 1.0000 1.0753 1.0000 1.0373 1.0000 1.0433 1.0000 1.0545 1.0000 
Tender Offer 0.1383 0.0000 0.1920 0.0000 0.1398 0.0000 0.1578 0.0000 0.1522 0.0000 0.0364 0.0000 
Merger of equals 0.0215 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000 0.0108 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0209 0.0000 0.0364 0.0000 
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Table 4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirer and Target  
          This table presents results of univariate analysis and reports cumulative abnormal returns based on 
the market model (MM) and the Fama French 3-factor model (Fama-French) for the acquirer and the 
target over five event windows. In panel A, the results of full sample are presented first, followed by four 
subsamples with different types of connections based on our definition. The last category of panel A 
reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of non-connected deals, which do not have any type of 
connection defined in the thesis. Panel B presents the difference in mean CARs between the connected 
and unconnected subsamples.  
Panel A Univariate Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Category    [0, 0] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-5,5] 
        








































































































































































Target MM 18.68% 26.99% 26.92% 27.41% 28.09% 
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Panel B Difference Test in Means  
 [0, 0] [-1, 1] [-2, 2] [-3, 3] [-5, 5] 
Diff (2-6) -0.0313 -0.0351 -0.0319 -0.0414 -0.0352 
 (0.0329**) (0.0309**) (0.0395**) (0.0114**) (0.0054***) 
Diff (3-6)   -0.0286 -0.0344 -0.034 -0.04 -0.0336 
 (0.0771*) (0.0457*) (0.0279**) (0.0146**) (0.0078***) 
Diff (4-6) -0.0249 -0.029 -0.0263 -0.0355 -0.0278 
 (0.0078***) (0.0097***) (0.0206**) (0.0046***) (0.0102**) 
Diff (5-6) -0.0232 -0.0288 -0.0254 -0.0356 -0.0265 








Table 5 Variables Summary 
Variable Label Database 
Deal_id_1st One for deals with 1st degree of connections and zero 
otherwise 
SDC, BoardEx  
Percent_1st The average ties for the deals with 1st degree of connections  Edgar, BoardEx 
Deal_id_2nd One for deals with 2nd degree of connections and zero 
otherwise 
SDC, BoardEx 
Deal_id_2nd_ex  One for deals with and only with 2nd degree of connections 
and zero otherwise 
SDC, BoardEx 
Percent_2nd  The average ties for the deals with 2nd degree of connections Edgar, BoardEx 
Deal_id_3rd One for deals with 3rd degree of connections and zero 
otherwise 
SDC, BoardEx 
Deal_id_3rd_ex One for deals with and only with 3rd degree of connections 
and zero otherwise 
SDC, BoardEx 
Percent_3rd  The average ties for the deals with 3rd degree of connections Edgar, BoardEx 
Deal_id_4th  One for deals with 4th degree of connections and zero 
otherwise 
ThomsonReuters 
Deal_id_4th_ex One for deals with and only with 4th degree of connections 
and zero otherwise 
ThomsonReuters 
Percent_4th The average ties for the deals with 4th degree of connections ThomsonReuters, 
CRSP 
Size Natural log of total assets of the firm Compustat, Bloomberg 
Q Tobin’s q of the firm, market value of assets over book value 
of assets 
Compustat, Bloomberg 
Leverage Leverage of the firm, book value of debt over book value of 
assets  
Compustat, Bloomberg 
Run-up buy-and-hold abnormal return over the event window 
[-219, -60] adjusted by CRSP value-weighted market return 
CRSP 
ROA Return on asset of the firm, operating income before 
depreciation, called by book value of assets 
Compustat, Bloomberg 
OCF Sales minus the cost of goods sold, sales and general 
administration expenses, and working capital change, scaled 




InsiderOwnership The number reported in the table reporting beneficial 
ownership in the proxy statements obtained from Edgar.  
The total ownership of officers and directors as a  group 
Edgar 
StockDeal One for deals financed partially or fully with stock and zero 
otherwise 
SDC 
DiversifyingAcquisition One if the acquirer and the target do not share the same 2-
digit SIC code and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
RelativeDealSize Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity  SDC, Compustat 
TenderOffer One for tender offers and zero otherwise SDC 
Attitude One if the acquirer is hostile and zero otherwise SDC 
MergerEquals One if the deal is a merger of equals and zero otherwise  SDC 




Table 6   Regression Analyses for Director Connections by Using Continuous Variable 
          This table presents the regression results for our full sample by using continuous variables to measure the closeness of connections. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent 
variables are the first three types of connections. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES All All 1st Type 1st Type 2nd Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 3rd Type 
         
Percent_1st -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0033     
 (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021)     
Percent_2nd_ex -0.0019 -0.0021       
 (0.0027) (0.0026)       
Percent_3rd_ex -0.0006 -0.0007       
 (0.0008) (0.0008)       
Percent_2nd     -0.0006 -0.0007*   
     (0.0004) (0.0004)   
Percent_3rd       -0.0007 -0.0009 
       (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Size -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0005 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Q -0.0036 -0.0025 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0025 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Leverage 0.0429*** 0.0446*** 0.0442*** 0.0460*** 0.0428*** 0.0449*** 0.0431*** 0.0449*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Stock Run-up 0.0946** 0.0813** 0.0919** 0.0792** 0.0950** 0.0818** 0.0955** 0.0823** 
 (0.0400) (0.0404) (0.0397) (0.0402) (0.0398) (0.0404) (0.0397) (0.0401) 
Stock_Deal -0.0305*** -0.0289*** -0.0311*** -0.0297*** -0.0307*** -0.0292*** -0.0313*** -0.0297*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
OCF -0.0245 -0.0269 -0.0236 -0.0261 -0.0240 -0.0265 -0.0247 -0.0272 
 (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0195) 
InsiderOwnership 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0090* 0.0084* 0.0090* 0.0083 0.0089* 0.0081 0.0096* 0.0088* 
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 (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
TenderOffer -0.0052 -0.0050 -0.0059 -0.0057 -0.0060 -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0056 
 (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
MergerEquals 0.0306* 0.0295* 0.0301* 0.0289 0.0305* 0.0292 0.0309* 0.0297* 
 (0.0172) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0173) (0.0180) 
NumberBids -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0033 -0.0041 -0.0036 
 (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.0063 -0.0070 0.0051 -0.0073 0.0034 -0.0090 0.0047 -0.0085 
 (0.0210) (0.0237) (0.0208) (0.0236) (0.0208) (0.0236) (0.0209) (0.0236) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 881 881 882 882 881 881 882 882 












Table 7   Regression Analyses for Director Connections by Using Discrete Variable 
             This table reports the regression results for the full sample by using discrete variables to measure the existence of connections. The 
dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent 
variables are the first three types of connections. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES All All 1st Type 1st Type 2nd Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 3rd Type 
         
Deal_id_1st -0.0135 -0.0118 -0.0110 -0.0089     
 (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0124)     
Deal_id_2nd_ex 0.0016 0.0029       
 (0.0094) (0.0095)       
Deal_id_3rd_ex -0.0078 -0.0092*       
 (0.0055) (0.0056)       
Deal_id_2nd     -0.0009 0.0000   
     (0.0078) (0.0078)   
Deal_id_3rd       -0.0075 -0.0090 
       (0.0054) (0.0056) 
Size -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Q -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0025 
 (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Leverage 0.0421*** 0.0434*** 0.0430*** 0.0448*** 0.0426*** 0.0446*** 0.0418*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Stock Run-up 0.0991** 0.0861** 0.0947** 0.0820** 0.0937** 0.0813** 0.0978** 0.0843** 
 (0.0400) (0.0403) (0.0396) (0.0401) (0.0397) (0.0402) (0.0399) (0.0402) 
Stock_Deal -0.0313*** -0.0298*** -0.0312*** -0.0299*** -0.0315*** -0.0301*** -0.0313*** -0.0297*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
OCF -0.0245 -0.0267 -0.0244 -0.0269 -0.0242 -0.0269 -0.0241 -0.0264 
 (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
InsiderOwnership 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0092* 0.0085* 0.0091* 0.0084* 0.0093* 0.0085* 0.0092* 0.0085* 
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 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
TenderOffer -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0064 -0.0061 -0.0055 -0.0053 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) 
MergerEquals 0.0303* 0.0293 0.0302* 0.0291 0.0308* 0.0296 0.0308* 0.0295* 
 (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0172) (0.0179) 
NumberBids -0.0043 -0.0038 -0.0039 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0040 -0.0033 
 (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.0079 -0.0060 0.0038 -0.0085 0.0027 -0.0092 0.0067 -0.0074 
 (0.0209) (0.0234) (0.0207) (0.0236) (0.0207) (0.0234) (0.0212) (0.0237) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 882 882 














Table 8 Regression Analyses for Director Connections Period 1 (1999-2007) 
         This table presents the regression results during 1999-2007. Column (1) – (6) report regressions using continuous variables, and column (7) 
– (9) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the 
event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the first three types of connections. 
 Continuous Variable Discrete Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 1st Type 2nd Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type  
          
Percent_1st -0.0070** -0.0075**        
 (0.0034) (0.0036)        
Percent_2nd    -0.0033*** -0.0026***      
   (0.0008) (0.0010)      
Percent_3rd     -0.0021** -0.0019*    
     (0.0010) (0.0010)    
Deal_id_1st       -0.0191   
       (0.0179)   
Deal_id_2nd        -0.0047  
        (0.0105)  
Deal_id_3rd         -0.0077 
         (0.0077) 
Size  0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Q  -0.0060*  -0.0058*  -0.0051 -0.0060** -0.0057* -0.0055* 
  (0.0030)  (0.0031)  (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Leverage  0.0411**  0.0409**  0.0416** 0.0400** 0.0398** 0.0400** 
  (0.0192)  (0.0192)  (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0192) 
Stock Run-up  0.1330**  0.1260**  0.1360** 0.1370** 0.1290** 0.1380** 
  (0.0625)  (0.0630)  (0.0631) (0.0627) (0.0630) (0.0640) 
Stock_Deal  -0.0362***  -0.0357***  -0.0365*** -0.0365*** -0.0365*** -0.0364*** 
  (0.0070)  (0.0070)  (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0069) 
OCF  -0.0049  -0.0048  -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0045 -0.0050 
  (0.0273)  (0.0272)  (0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0271) (0.0272) 
InsiderOwnership  0.0005  0.0005  0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 
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  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
DiversifyingAcquisition  0.0037  0.0031  0.0059 0.0039 0.0041 0.0046 
  (0.0067)  (0.0068)  (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0068) 
TenderOffer  0.0076  0.0075  0.0081 0.0080 0.0073 0.0077 
  (0.0089)  (0.0088)  (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
MergerEquals  0.0633**  0.0651***  0.0633*** 0.0634** 0.0642** 0.0624** 
  (0.0252)  (0.0238)  (0.0241) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0251) 
NumberBids  0.0109  0.0108  0.0101 0.0110 0.0119 0.0108 
  (0.0196)  (0.0198)  (0.0202) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0198) 
Constant -0.0280* -0.0165 -0.0286* -0.0144 -0.0286* -0.0170 -0.0165 -0.0167 -0.0175 
 (0.0153) (0.0375) (0.0154) (0.0376) (0.0154) (0.0378) (0.0375) (0.0373) (0.0374) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 














Table 9 Regression Analyses for Director Connections Period 2 (2008-2013) 
         This table presents the regression results during 2008-2013. Column (1) – (6) report regressions using continuous variables, and column (7) – 
(9) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event 
window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the first three types of connections. 
 Continuous Variable Discrete Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 1st Type 2nd Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type  
          
Percent_1st -0.0028 -0.0026        
 (0.0026) (0.0023)        
Percent_2nd   -0.0007 -0.0005      
   (0.0005) (0.0004)      
Percent_3rd     0.0000 0.0003    
     (0.0011) (0.0011)    
Deal_id_1st       -0.0024   
       (0.0168)   
Deal_id_2nd        0.0066  
        (0.0112)  
Deal_id_3rd         -0.0060 
         (0.0082) 
Size  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Q  0.0010  0.0012  0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
  (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Leverage  0.0540***  0.0524***  0.0522*** 0.0524*** 0.0519*** 0.0511*** 
  (0.0192)  (0.0193)  (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191) 
Stock Run-up  0.0580  0.0621  0.0593 0.0598 0.0618 0.0616 
  (0.0517)  (0.0520)  (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0515) 
Stock_Deal  -0.0249***  -0.0242***  -0.0255*** -0.0253*** -0.0259*** -0.0249*** 
  (0.0078)  (0.0079)  (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
OCF  -0.0495*  -0.0504*  -0.0502* -0.0504* -0.0507* -0.0501* 
  (0.0275)  (0.0275)  (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) 
InsiderOwnership  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
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  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
DiversifyingAcquisition  0.0121*  0.0119  0.0123* 0.0123* 0.0123* 0.0121 
  (0.0073)  (0.0074)  (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0074) 
TenderOffer  -0.0114  -0.0113  -0.0120 -0.0117 -0.0120 -0.0111 
  (0.0097)  (0.0098)  (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
MergerEquals  -0.0037  -0.0036  -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0019 
  (0.0230)  (0.0229)  (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0228) 
NumberBids  -0.0197  -0.0194  -0.0194 -0.0194 -0.0200 -0.0189 
  (0.0153)  (0.0154)  (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
Constant -0.0584** -0.0036 -0.0598** -0.0067 -0.0609** -0.0078 -0.0067 -0.0063 -0.0039 
 (0.0293) (0.0394) (0.0291) (0.0392) (0.0294) (0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0391) (0.0395) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 500 500 499 499 500 500 500 500 500 














Table 10 Regression Analyses for Director Connections Non-Financial Firms (1999-2007) 
           This table presents the regression results for non-financial firms during 1999-2007. Column (1) – (3) report regressions using continuous 
variables, and column (4) – (6) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the 
acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the first three types of connections. 
 Continuous Variable Discrete Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 
       
Percent_1st  -0.0072      
 (0.0049)      
Percent_2nd   -0.0020**     
  (0.0008)     
Percent_3rd   -0.0011    
   (0.0014)    
Deal_id_1st    -0.0130   
    (0.0234)   
Deal_id_2nd     0.0019  
     (0.0113)  
Deal_id_3rd      -0.0045 
      (0.0116) 
Size -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0011 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Q -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0043 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Leverage 0.0387 0.0383 0.0394 0.0383 0.0392 0.0386 
 (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0254) 
Stock Run-up 0.2100** 0.2010** 0.2090** 0.2140** 0.2090** 0.2120** 
 (0.0938) (0.0949) (0.0948) (0.0942) (0.0949) (0.0955) 
Stock_Deal -0.0381*** -0.0382*** -0.0383*** -0.0390*** -0.0400*** -0.0389*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0112) 
OCF 0.0059 0.0057 0.0046 0.0056 0.0055 0.0052 
 (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0308) (0.0310) 
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InsiderOwnership 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
DiversifyingAcquisition -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0023 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0032 
 (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0091) 
TenderOffer 0.0056 0.0052 0.0056 0.0057 0.0054 0.0054 
 (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
MergerEquals 0.0878** 0.0882** 0.0869** 0.0881** 0.0892*** 0.0882** 
 (0.0343) (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) 
NumberBids 0.0258 0.0262 0.0258 0.0261 0.0266 0.0260 
 (0.0228) (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0225) (0.0232) 
Constant -0.0642 -0.0649 -0.0652 -0.0633 -0.0638 -0.0653 
 (0.0556) (0.0558) (0.0557) (0.0553) (0.0551) (0.0554) 
Industry Fixed Effects 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Year Fixed Effects 0.0033 0.0035 0.0035 0.0030 0.0031 0.0035 
       
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236 












Table 11 Regression Analyses for Director Connections Non-Financial Firms (2008-2013) 
           This table presents the regression results for non-financial firms during 2008-2013. Column (1) – (3) report regressions using continuous 
variables, and column (4) – (6) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the 
acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the first three types of connections. 
 Continuous Variable Discrete Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 
       
Percent_1st  -0.0033      
 (0.0022)      
Percent_2nd   -0.0005     
  (0.0005)     
Percent_3rd   -0.0002    
   (0.0014)    
Deal_id_1st    -0.0050   
    (0.0182)   
Deal_id_2nd     0.0159  
     (0.0123)  
Deal_id_3rd      -0.0072 
      (0.0103) 
Size -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0021 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Q -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Leverage 0.0722*** 0.0703*** 0.0696*** 0.0699*** 0.0699*** 0.0677*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0215) 
Stock Run-up 0.0212 0.0263 0.0236 0.0240 0.0267 0.0265 
 (0.0636) (0.0640) (0.0633) (0.0634) (0.0631) (0.0633) 
Stock_Deal -0.0247** -0.0242** -0.0256** -0.0255** -0.0279*** -0.0257** 
 (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0104) 
OCF -0.0447 -0.0456 -0.0458 -0.0457 -0.0466* -0.0449 
 (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0282) 
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InsiderOwnership -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0220*** 0.0217*** 0.0220*** 0.0220*** 0.0215*** 0.0215*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0083) 
TenderOffer -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0042 
 (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
MergerEquals -0.0396 -0.0389 -0.0375 -0.0383 -0.0351 -0.0357 
 (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0305) 
NumberBids -0.0325 -0.0322 -0.0324 -0.0321 -0.0333 -0.0318 
 (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0214) 
Constant -0.0111 -0.0159 -0.0156 -0.0152 -0.0147 -0.0123 
 (0.0477) (0.0475) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0477) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 351 350 351 351 351 351 












Table 12 Regression Analyses for Director Connections by Controlling Acquirer and Target Characteristics (1999-2007) 
           This table presents the regression results during 1999-2007 by controlling acquirer and target characteristics. Column (1) – (3) report 
regressions using continuous variables, and column (4) – (6) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the first three types of 
connections. 
 Continuous Variable Discrete Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 
       
Percent_1st -0.0072*      
 (0.0038)      
Percent_2nd   -0.0028***     
  (0.0011)     
Percent_3rd   -0.0019*    
   (0.0012)    
Deal_id_1st    -0.0163   
    (0.0193)   
Deal_id_2nd     -0.0017  
     (0.0117)  
Deal_id_3rd      -0.0097 
      (0.0083) 
Size_A 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Q_A -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0058* -0.0057 -0.0055 
 (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Leverage_A 0.0420* 0.0416* 0.0430* 0.0412* 0.0421* 0.0421* 
 (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0237) 
StockRun-up_A 0.1210* 0.1130 0.1180* 0.1230* 0.1160 0.1220* 
 (0.0709) (0.0712) (0.0712) (0.0712) (0.0717) (0.0718) 
Size_T -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0032 
 (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Q_T -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0050 -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0059 
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 (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0048) 
Leverage_T 0.0054 0.0071 0.0052 0.0046 0.0044 0.0050 
 (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0226) 
StockRun-up_T 0.1700* 0.1720* 0.1750* 0.1720* 0.1770* 0.1810* 
 (0.0976) (0.0978) (0.0977) (0.0976) (0.0981) (0.0967) 
OCF_A 0.0035 0.0035 0.0049 0.0035 0.0045 0.0047 
 (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0292) 
OCF_T 0.0033 0.0032 0.0001 0.0029 0.0021 0.0007 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0183) 
InsiderOwnership_A 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
InsiderOwnership_T 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Stock_Deal -0.0370*** -0.0362*** -0.0377*** -0.0374*** -0.0376*** -0.0372*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0040 0.0034 0.0063 0.0043 0.0047 0.0053 
 (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
TenderOffer 0.0056 0.0055 0.0060 0.0059 0.0054 0.0055 
 (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
MergerEquals 0.0690** 0.0715** 0.0687** 0.0692** 0.0700** 0.0678** 
 (0.0329) (0.0309) (0.0314) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0325) 
NumberBids 0.0122 0.0122 0.0107 0.0123 0.0130 0.0117 
 (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0210) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0204) 
Constant -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0049 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0049 
 (0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0433) (0.0427) (0.0431) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333 





Table 13 Regression Analyses for Director Connections by Controlling Acquirer and Target Characteristics (2008-2013) 
           This table presents the regression results during 2008-2013 by controlling acquirer and target characteristics. Column (1) – (3) report 
regressions using continuous variables, and column (4) – (6) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the first three types of 
connections. 
 Continuous Variable Discrete Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 
       
Percent_1st -0.0030      
 (0.0021)      
Percent_2nd   -0.0009**     
  (0.0003)     
Percent_3rd   0.0015    
   (0.0012)    
Deal_id_1st    -0.0039   
    (0.0177)   
Deal_id_2nd     0.0117  
     (0.0127)  
Deal_id_3rd      0.0068 
      (0.0098) 
Size_A 0.0002 0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Q_A 0.0021 0.0021 0.0022 0.0020 0.0023 0.0021 
 (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0047) 
Leverage_A 0.0363 0.0346 0.0326 0.0345 0.0340 0.0349 
 (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0241) (0.0238) 
StockRun-up_A 0.0704 0.0725 0.0717 0.0721 0.0767 0.0706 
 (0.0575) (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0575) (0.0573) (0.0576) 
Size_T -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0016 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
Q_T -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0012 
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 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0054) 
Leverage_T 0.0022 0.0016 0.0038 0.0013 0.0015 0.0023 
 (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0243) 
StockRun-up_T -0.0218 -0.0159 -0.0214 -0.0188 -0.0193 -0.0209 
 (0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0563) (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0572) 
OCF_A -0.0582* -0.0575* -0.0568* -0.0586* -0.0584* -0.0588* 
 (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0317) 
OCF_T 0.0269* 0.0266 0.0261 0.0265 0.0265 0.0270 
 (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0164) 
InsiderOwnership_A -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
InsiderOwnership_T 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Stock_Deal -0.0230** -0.0213** -0.0234** -0.0231** -0.0236** -0.0231** 
 (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0098) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0049 0.0049 0.0047 0.0052 0.0049 0.0052 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
TenderOffer -0.0073 -0.0071 -0.0084 -0.0078 -0.0080 -0.0082 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109) 
MergerEquals 0.0082 0.0084 0.0086 0.0089 0.0107 0.0088 
 (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
NumberBids -0.0155 -0.0151 -0.0148 -0.0150 -0.0154 -0.0155 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0179) 
Constant 0.0126 0.0086 0.0063 0.0105 0.0112 0.0066 
 (0.0455) (0.0453) (0.0455) (0.0456) (0.0449) (0.0454) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 406 405 406 406 406 406 





Table 14 Regression Analyses for Director Connections by Reconstituting Subsamples 
          This table presents the regression results by reconstituting three subsamples. The subsample in column (1) and (4) consists of deals with the 
first type of connection and deals without any kind of connection introduced in this thesis. The other two subsamples are constituted analogously. 
Column (1) – (3) report regressions using continuous variables, and column (4) – (6) report regressions using discrete variables. The dependent 
variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5], and the main independent variables are the 
first three types of connections. 
 Continuous Variables Discrete Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 
       
Percent_1st  -0.0058**      
 (0.0028)      
Percent_2nd   -0.0012**     
  (0.0005)     
Percent_3rd   -0.0010    
   (0.0008)    
Deal_id_1st    -0.0252   
    (0.0162)   
Deal_id_2nd     -0.0309**  
     (0.0142)  
Deal_id_3rd      -0.0223** 
      (0.0102) 
Size 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0035 0.0048 0.0000 
 (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0016) 
Q -0.0106 -0.0024 0.0009 -0.0119 -0.0017 0.0007 
 (0.0083) (0.0056) (0.0027) (0.0086) (0.0054) (0.0027) 
Leverage 0.0873* 0.0671* 0.0495*** 0.0663 0.0556 0.0475*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0392) (0.0162) (0.0485) (0.0373) (0.0161) 
Stock Run-up -0.0025 0.0169 0.0304 0.0202 0.0048 0.0314 
 (0.0733) (0.0621) (0.0267) (0.0683) (0.0605) (0.0265) 
Stock_Deal -0.0213 -0.0255* -0.0279*** -0.0235 -0.0267** -0.0278*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0129) (0.0059) (0.0143) (0.0122) (0.0059) 
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OCF -0.1790*** -0.0289 -0.0381* -0.1930*** -0.0292 -0.0374* 
 (0.0659) (0.0542) (0.0216) (0.0661) (0.0539) (0.0217) 
InsiderOwnership -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0143 0.0125 0.0072 0.0148 0.0138 0.0064 
 (0.0195) (0.0142) (0.0056) (0.0198) (0.0137) (0.0056) 
TenderOffer 0.0042 -0.0206 -0.0082 0.0030 -0.0161 -0.0072 
 (0.0273) (0.0211) (0.0077) (0.0290) (0.0215) (0.0077) 
MergerEquals 0.1040** 0.0198 0.0171 0.0963** 0.0159 0.0166 
 (0.0419) (0.0422) (0.0209) (0.0386) (0.0336) (0.0206) 
NumberBids -0.0448* 0.0338 -0.0082 -0.0419* 0.0383 -0.0083 
 (0.0259) (0.0263) (0.0179) (0.0221) (0.0257) (0.0178) 
Constant 0.0280 -0.0809 -0.0083 0.0168 -0.0994** 0.0043 
 (0.0630) (0.0494) (0.0275) (0.0620) (0.0489) (0.0282) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 101 143 703 101 144 703 











Table 15 Regression Analyses for Director and Senior Manager Connections 
           This table presents the regression results. Directors and senior managers are both taken into account to count the connections. The 
dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5]. Model (1) includes all four types 
of connections and model (2) incorporates the first three types. Column 3 to column 6 reports the results for each type of connection, respectively. 
Column 7 shows the results for the fourth type by using continuous variable to measure the connections. 
 All 1st Type 2nd Type  3rd Type  4th Type  4th Type 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Deal_id_1st -0.0300** -0.0062     
 (0.0121) (0.0075)     
Deal_id_2nd_ex -0.0251*      
 (0.0138)      
Deal_id_3rd_ex -0.0272***      
 (0.0103)      
Deal_id_4th_ex -0.0191      
 (0.0118)      
Deal_id_2nd   -0.0017    
   (0.0075)    
Deal_id_3rd    -0.0130**   
    (0.0062)   
Deal_id_4th     -0.0067  
     (0.0062)  
Percent _4th      -0.0001 
      (0.0001) 
Size -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Q -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0027 
 (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Leverage 0.0462*** 0.0458*** 0.0458*** 0.0455*** 0.0463*** 0.0469*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0142) 
Stock Run-up  0.0429* 0.0416* 0.0426* 0.0436* 0.0426* 0.0433* 
 (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0238) 
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Stock_Deal -0.0296*** -0.0300*** -0.0301*** -0.0295*** -0.0302*** -0.0299*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
OCF -0.0288 -0.0274 -0.0282 -0.0285 -0.0290 -0.0290 
 (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
InsiderOwnership 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0080 0.0082 0.0083* 0.0084* 0.0083 0.0083* 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) 
TenderOffer -0.0038 -0.0051 -0.0055 -0.0045 -0.0050 -0.0054 
 (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
Attitude 0.0301* 0.0312* 0.0313* 0.0305* 0.0315* 0.0318* 
 (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0182) 
MergerEquals 0.0777 0.0744 0.0766 0.0795 0.0771 0.0771 
 (0.0835) (0.0833) (0.0842) (0.0843) (0.0837) (0.0840) 
NumberBids -0.0072 -0.0062 -0.0067 -0.0077 -0.0067 -0.0063 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
Constant 0.0151 -0.0039 -0.0043 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0047 
 (0.0237) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0225) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 









Table 16 Regression Analyses for Director and Senior Manager Connections (Non-Financial Firms) 
          This table presents the regression results for non-financial firms. Directors and senior managers are both taken into account to count the 
connections. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5]. Model (1) 
includes all four types of connections. Column 2 to column 5 reports the results for each type of connection, respectively. Column 6 shows the 
results for the fourth type by using continuous variable to measure the connections. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All 1st Type 2nd Type  3rd Type  4th Type  4th Type 
       
Deal_id_1st -0.0445** -0.0117     
 (0.0180) (0.0087)     
Deal_id_2nd_ex -0.0358*      
 (0.0194)      
Deal_id_3rd_ex -0.0353**      
 (0.0167)      
Deal_id_4th_ex -0.0312      
 (0.0191)      
Deal_id_2nd   -0.0017    
   (0.0085)    
Deal_id_3rd    -0.0126   
    (0.0090)   
Deal_id_4th     -0.0019  
     (0.0092)  
Percent _4th      0.0001 
      (0.0002) 
Size -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0021 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Q -0.0026 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
Leverage 0.0578*** 0.0580*** 0.0595*** 0.0579*** 0.0597*** 0.0598*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Stock Run-up  0.0378 0.0382 0.0394 0.0400 0.0395 0.0403 
 (0.0290) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0290) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
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Stock_Deal -0.0328*** -0.0328*** -0.0338*** -0.0331*** -0.0340*** -0.0333*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) 
OCF -0.0237 -0.0220 -0.0241 -0.0245 -0.0245 -0.0253 
 (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0211) 
InsiderOwnership -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0096 0.0099 0.0100 0.0101 0.0099 0.0101 
 (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0063) 
TenderOffer -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0030 -0.0029 
 (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Attitude 0.0275 0.0287 0.0291 0.0298 0.0292 0.0291 
 (0.0276) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0279) (0.0287) (0.0288) 
MergerEquals 0.2090*** 0.2020*** 0.2100*** 0.2140*** 0.2090*** 0.2100*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0294) (0.0299) (0.0286) (0.0294) (0.0293) 
NumberBids -0.0125 -0.0102 -0.0118 -0.0140 -0.0118 -0.0114 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Constant 0.0420 0.0068 0.0057 0.0138 0.0073 0.0068 
 (0.0331) (0.0278) (0.0280) (0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0280) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 587 587 587 587 587 587 









Table 17 Regression Analyses for Director and Senior Manager Connections by Reconstituting Subsamples 
          This table presents the regression results for reconstituted subsamples. Directors and senior managers are both taken into account to count 
the connections. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm over the event window [-5, 5]. The 
subsample in column (1) and (2) consists of deals with the first type of connection and deals without any kind of connection introduced in this 
thesis. The other three subsamples in the remaining columns are constituted analogously. 
 1st Type 2nd Type 3rd Type 4th Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CARwindow5 CARwindow5 CARwindow5 CARwindow5 CARwindow5 CARwindow5 CARwindow5 CARwindow5 
         
Deal_id_1st -0.0349** -0.0307**       
 (0.0137) (0.0137)       
Deal_id_2nd   -0.0401*** -0.0412***     
   (0.0140) (0.0141)     
Deal_id_3rd     -0.0278*** -0.0274***   
     (0.0104) (0.0104)   
Deal_id_4th       -0.0256** -0.0250** 
       (0.0104) (0.0103) 
Size 0.0005 0.0007 0.0044 0.0050 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0014 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Q -0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0040 -0.0032 
 (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
Leverage 0.0930*** 0.0879*** 0.0747** 0.0674* 0.0377** 0.0425*** 0.0460*** 0.0454*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0362) (0.0366) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Stock Run-up  0.0227 0.0259 0.0224 0.0187 0.0380 0.0320 0.0716*** 0.0658*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0523) (0.0555) (0.0558) (0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0250) (0.0252) 
Stock_Deal -0.0217* -0.0156 -0.0152 -0.0151 -0.0319*** -0.0297*** -0.0316*** -0.0301*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) 
OCF -0.0833** -0.0858** -0.0219 -0.0193 -0.0242 -0.0288 -0.0037 -0.0034 
 (0.0421) (0.0412) (0.0532) (0.0535) (0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0215) 
InsiderOwnership -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DiversifyingAcquisition 0.0036 0.0025 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0099* 0.0089* 0.0069 0.0061 
76 
 
 (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
TenderOffer 0.0015 0.0014 -0.0072 -0.0095 -0.0083 -0.0076 -0.0019 -0.0028 
 (0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0076) 
MergerEquals 0.0285 0.0378 -0.0021 0.0038 0.0218 0.0180 0.0357** 0.0354* 
 (0.0259) (0.0311) (0.0283) (0.0297) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0185) 
NumberBids -0.0079 -0.0087 0.0380 0.0390 -0.0093 -0.0099 -0.0023 -0.0009 
 (0.0231) (0.0241) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0133) (0.0135) 
Constant 0.0187 -0.0052 -0.0619 -0.0852* 0.0289 0.0098 0.0393 0.0195 
 (0.0444) (0.0501) (0.0444) (0.0493) (0.0255) (0.0279) (0.0240) (0.0266) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 180 180 148 148 752 752 771 771 














Table 18 Return to Overlapping Institutional Shareholders Based on the Deal Level 
         This table presents the analysis for cross-holding institutional shareholders based on the deal level. Dollar returns and adjusted returns to 
such shareholders over the five event windows are reported first, followed by the percentages of holdings of cross-holding institutional 
shareholders on the acquirer and the target.  







































































































Table 19 Return to Overlapping Institutional Shareholders Based on the Shareholder Level 
         This table presents the analysis for cross-holding institutional shareholders based on the shareholder level. In panel A, dollar returns (in 
thousand) and adjusted returns to such shareholders over the five event windows are reported first, followed by the percentages of holdings of 
cross-holding institutional shareholders on the acquirer and the target. Panel B tests the difference in overlapping shareholders’ stakes in the 
acquirer and the target. Panel C examines the returns to cross-holding institutional shareholders in the transactions with negative acquirer 
announcement returns.  
Panel A:   Return to Overlapping Institutional Shareholders Based on Shareholder Level 
 






Mean 451.27421 1439.32 674.99607 1012.33 1336.85 0.38008 0.44916 
Median 8.0779395 67.6618082 51.3589464 55.1186257 70.0046834 0.053776 0.060569 
Std.Dev 18477.77 21208.54 23019.71 31330.74 35934 1.06238 1.33313 
N  42198 42198 42198 42198 42198 42198 42198 
Scaled 
Return 
Mean 0.0244475 0.0392981 0.0352462 0.0391225 0.0429148 0.38008 0.44916 
Median 0.0030867 0.0165212 0.0154094 0.0154704 0.0195445 0.053776 0.060569 
Std.Dev 0.0867123 0.0970669 0.1019109 0.1154771 0.1169554 1.06238 1.33313 
N  42198 42198 42198 42198 42198 42198 42198 
Panel B:    Stakes Difference Test 
Type N Mean Std Dev Std Err Minimum Maximum 
Ownership on Acquirer 42198 0.00380 0.0106 0.000052 2.98E-10 0.3650 
Ownership on Target 42198 0.00449 0.0133 0.000065 9.26E-10 0.8000 
Diff (1-2)  -0.00069*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0121 0.000083   
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Panel C:    Negative Acquirer Announcement Returns 
  (0,0) (-1,1) (-2,2) (-3,3) (-5,5) 
Return from total deal Mean  -897.22 -585.68 -1747.4 -1972.5 -2565.4 
 N 29340 28259 27942 27281 25720 
Return from Bidder Mean -2848.8 -3386.2 -4301.9 -4422.1 -5121 
 N 29340 28259 27942 27281 25720 
Diff (1-2) Mean 1951.619 2800.542 2554.51 2449.62 2555.6 
















Table 20 Return to Overlapping Institutional Shareholders for Classification Subsample 
                This table presents the analysis for cross-holding institutional shareholders based on the shareholder level. Panel A reports dollar returns 
and adjusted returns to different types of cross-holding institutional shareholders over the five event windows. Panel B examines the returns to 
cross-holding institutional shareholders in the transactions with negative acquirer announcement returns. Dedicated institutional shareholders 
behave like active investors (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998. Transient institutional investors make frequent transactions and tend to hold small stakes 
in various firms (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998). Quasi-indexing institutional shareholders behave like passive investors (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998).  
Panel A: Return to Overlapping Institutional Shareholders Based on Shareholder Level 
 




Mean 4489.25 9716.65 7015.34 7634.27 8530.25 
Std Dev 47767.61 62752.16 60506.35 76946.35 91154.77 
 Median 17.4115385 196.3941533 153.1605269 152.8716152 185.6678542 
Quasi-indexer 
(N=28503) 
Mean 321.5945188 1388.64 533.9861087 953.4278758 1319.46 
Std Dev 19597.01 21683.13 24146.07 33740.27 38697.99 
 Median 5.3090319 63.6554434 47.7227829 51.1031149 66.7477315 
Transient 
(N=12113) 
Mean 439.2559004 922.3304411 504.5027821 632.3756744 825.0684975 
Std Dev 9729.39 11309.38 12907.94 15609.32 16734.83 




Mean 0.0235229 0.040399 0.0379774 0.0402125 0.0446077 
Std Dev 0.0906236 0.1040435 0.1092745 0.1203493 0.1226565 
 Median 0.0040882 0.0179435 0.0163179 0.0162943 0.0187005 
Quasi-indexer 
(N=28503) 
Mean 0.0210668 0.0349336 0.0308381 0.0349134 0.0388049 
Std Dev 0.0815126 0.0912148 0.0959649 0.1105121 0.1120591 
 Median 0.0021767 0.0135327 0.0129796 0.0128979 0.0165264 
Transient 
(N=12113) 
Mean 0.0322208 0.048896 0.0450129 0.0484052 0.0519163 
Std Dev 0.0968434 0.108038 0.1131551 0.1246 0.1264303 
  Median 0.0059301 0.0231263 0.0220771 0.0217449 0.0261580 
Panel B: Negative Acquirer Announcement Returns 
Dollar Return Dedicated Mean -1223.55 -793.048014 -2878.95 -5461.63 -8363.29 
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Median -61.6809206 -12.8689008 -38.4694540 -54.2523698 -62.4684353 
N 671 639 629 625 587 
Quasi-indexer Mean -1194.92 -854.438772 -2157.49 -2351.85 -3037.12 
Median -46.2239237 -23.6083670 -56.3430582 -59.5010586 -99.2768836 
N 19950 19242 18999 18451 17384 
Transient Mean -184.45457 -69.8910332 -738.09470 -864.98632 -1087.68 
Median -15.3538423 -1.3081502 -12.3234464 -7.2358332 -25.9763226 
N 8300 8002 7932 7857 7406 
Scaled Return 
Dedicated Mean 0.0097372 0.0156605 0.0099915 0.0064628 0.0079378 
Median -0.0050182 -0.0045590 -0.0074378 -0.0075768 -0.0117175 
N 671 639 629 625 587 
Quasi-indexer Mean 0.0046992 0.0117363 0.0033335 0.0016947 0.000165887 
Median -0.0063344 -0.0061522 -0.0111480 -0.0103523 -0.0166272 
N 19950 19242 18999 18451 17384 
Transient Mean 0.0192593 0.0257413 0.0177946 0.0171472 0.0173664 
Median -0.0043939 -0.0011434 -0.0062085 -0.0039790 -0.0092108 
N 8300 8002 7932 7857 7406 
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